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Among the main challenges of the predictive brain/mind concept is how to link prediction
at the neural level to prediction at the cognitive-psychological level and ﬁnding conceptually
robust and empirically veriﬁable ways to harness this theoretical framework toward explain-
ing higher-order mental and cognitive phenomena, including the subjective experience of
aesthetic and symbolic forms. Building on the tentative prediction error account of visual
art, this article extends the application of the predictive coding framework to the visual
arts. It does so by linking this theoretical discussion to a subjective, phenomenological
account of how a work of art is experienced. In order to engage more deeply with a work
of art, viewers must be able to tune or adapt their prediction mechanism to recognize art
as a speciﬁc class of objects whose ontological nature deﬁes predictability, and they must
be able to sustain a productive ﬂow of predictions from low-level sensory, recognitional
to abstract semantic, conceptual, and affective inferences.The affective component of the
process of predictive error optimization that occurs when a viewer enters into dialog with
a painting is constituted both by activating the affective affordances within the image and
by the affective consequences of prediction error minimization itself.The predictive coding
framework also has implications for the problem of the culturality of vision. A person’s
mindset, which determines what top–down expectations and predictions are generated, is
co-constituted by culture-relative skills and knowledge, which form hyperpriors that operate
in the perception of art.
Keywords: predictive coding, predictive error minimization, art perception, art experience, affective affordance,
reward in art, culturality of vision
INTRODUCTION
The old notion of perception as unconscious, knowledge-driven
inference (Helmholz, 1860/1962) or hypothesis testing (Gregory,
1980), which asserts that the brain actively anticipates upcom-
ing sensory input rather than passively registering it, has now
been recast in the terms of contemporary neuroscience, and
has recently undergone an unprecedented revitalization. It has
been linked to the idea of the Bayesian brain – a probabil-
ity machine that constantly makes predictions about the world
and then updates them based on what it senses. According
to predictive coding model of perceptual inference, subjects
try to infer the causes of their sensations based on multi-
level generative models of the world (Rao and Ballard, 1999;
Kersten et al., 2004; Bar, 2009; Friston, 2009; Rauss and Pour-
tois, 2013). Predictions (priors) about the probable cause of
sensory input, generated in higher levels of processing hierar-
chy, are continuously updated by prediction errors which code
mismatches between expected and actual data. Recently, some
theorists have further extended the predictive coding framework
(or predictive error minimization, PEM) from brain to mind,
applying it to a variety of cognitive mechanisms beyond per-
ception itself (Hohwy, 2013). According to philosopher Clark
(2013) the Bayesian approach constitutes the “grand uniﬁed
theory of mind as perception, action and attention are all in
the same business of reducing sensory prediction error result-
ing with our exchanges with environment” (Clark, 2013, p. 21).
As Friston (2013, p. 1330) notes, the higher-order aspects
of inference in the brain represent the frontiers of theoreti-
cal neurobiology. The main challenge is to link prediction at
the neural level with prediction at the cognitive-psychological
level and to ﬁnd conceptually robust and empirically veriﬁable
ways to harness this theoretical framework toward explain-
ing higher-order mental and cognitive phenomena, including
the subjective experience of aesthetic and symbolic forms. A
step in this direction has been taken in the recently pro-
posed “tentative prediction error account of visual art” (TPEA;
Van de Cruys and Wagemans, 2011).
It is the aim of this article to further extend the applica-
tion of the predictive coding framework to the visual arts. To
do this in a productive way requires moving from the rather
abstract level of theory formulation to a more detailed discus-
sion of particular instances of response to a work of art, that
is, it requires testing the theoretical model against a speciﬁc case
study. Consequently, the article is organized into three sections.
First, I shall articulate some objections to and problems with the
current formulation of the prediction error account of art per-
ception. Based on these observations, the second section presents
a case study of an encounter with a particular painting in order
to expand upon some key some aspects of predictive coding in
visual art. I shall focus especially on the problem of the emo-
tional response to a work of art within the PEM framework.
Finally, I shall point out further implications of this theoretical
model for the question of the social and cultural determination of
vision.
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KEY CONCEPTS
Bayesian brain
The notion that perceptual impression results exhaustively from
neuronal groups computing probability (P) of a hypothesis (H) given
data (D) according to Bayes rule for P(H| D):
P(H|D) = P(H) × P(D|H)/P(D)
The left-hand part of the equation corresponds to posterior proba-
bility, that is probability that the hypothesis is true given the new
data.
P(D|H) refers to the likelihood of compatibility of new data with prior
hypothesis and
P(H) or prior denotes one’s prior expectations about the probability
of the hypothesis and drives the interpretation of sensory data.
Predictive coding
According to hierarchical predictive coding framework of percep-
tual inference, brain does not passively register sensory input but
actively anticipates it. Neuronal representations at the higher lev-
els of processing hierarchy generate “conditional expectations of
perceptual causes” or predictions (priors), based on information in
memory and context, about the probable cause of sensory input.
These predictions are communicated to lower sensory areas by
feedback connections where they are compared with incoming
sensory data. Mismatches between expected and incoming data
form prediction errors which are passed by feedforward connec-
tions to update or change higher-level representations, creating the
most reasonable interpretation of incoming sensory input. There
are different interpretations of the predictive coding framework and
its neurobiological implementation in literature (e.g., Rao and Bal-
lard, 1999; Friston, 2002, 2008; Lee and Mumford, 2003; Knill and
Pouget, 2004; Yuille and Kersten, 2006; Summerﬁeld et al., 2006;
Bar, 2009; Friston and Kiebel, 2009; Rauss and Pourtois, 2013).
Prediction errorminimization=minimization of uncertainty about
the sensory data.
According to PEM model, brain continuously minimizes its predic-
tion error, that is the discrepancy between predictions (expecta-
tions) about the sensory data and the actual data.
I set out from the assumption that it is neither likely, nor indeed
desirable, for a prediction coding framework to ultimately form
a general biological “theory of art” or aesthetic perception – a
holy grail of neuroaesthetics, to which art historians and theo-
rists remain justiﬁably indifferent. Even if predictive coding could
assume the position of a grand uniﬁed brain theory (and some
doubt it can; see, e.g., Bowers and Davis, 2012; Anderson and
Chemero,2013), there are strong grounds for being skeptical about
the prospect of any comprehensive brain theory becoming also a
grand biological theory of art and art perception. What such a the-
ory could provide, however, is a framework with which to revisit
some long-standing questions in image studies, the psychology of
art and art history and out of which further empirical studies of
art perception could evolve.
THE PREDICTION ERROR ACCOUNT OF ART – CURRENT
FORMULATION AND ITS CONTRADICTION
The basic tenet of Van de Cruys and Wagemans (2011) model is
that a temporary state of unpredictability (or prediction error)
is important for the emergence of perceptual pleasure vis-a-vis
a work of art. Understanding perception in terms of predictions
means that it is possible for perceptual conﬁguration to induce
different sequences of affect and to do so partly independently
of the particular content of perception (TPEA, 1040). Accord-
ingly, artists are supposed to intentionally create incongruities
(perceived as prediction errors) that may not be possible in a nat-
ural visual environment, and viewers are able to tolerate and even
enjoy the unpredictability because they expect to be surprised in
their encounters with art (TPEA, 1041). By delaying prediction
conﬁrmation, artists create a positive affect: the viewer quickly
runs into incongruities, which presumably generate an arousal
aimed at reducing prediction errors. It is this incompatibility (or
prediction error) that is the source of some of the emotionality
of a work of art. In other words, artists intuitively attempt to
strike the optimal balance between predictability and surprise.
The mental effort required of a person in order to cope with
the prediction error is a condition sine qua non for registering
the perceptual pleasure of a Gestalt formation (prediction error
reduction). According to Van de Cruys and Wagemans (2011):
“Only by using minimal prediction errors painters can ensure
that viewers will obtain their reward and not give up prema-
turely. Final gratiﬁcation postponed as long as the artist has hidden
in the painting enough micro reward the viewer can discover...”
(TPEA, 1050).
This concept is appealing for a number of reasons. First, it offers
a much stronger explanatory framework than the neuroscientiﬁc
and psychological models of art experience, which focus exclu-
sively on a bottom–up account of visual processing (Zeki, 1999;
Shimamura, 2013) and neglect or downplay the role of the top–
down, inferential activity of brain/mind. Second, although not
speciﬁcally stated by the authors, the model responds to the so-
called “dark room problem,” the apparent paradox that, in order
to minimize surprise, agents should avoid sensory stimulation
altogether and should proceed directly to the least stimulating
environment and stay there; they should take up a position in
the nearest “dark room” and never move again. Neatly summa-
rized: avoid surprises and you will last longer. Predictive coding
theorists offer a simple solution to the dark room scenario: prior
beliefs render dark rooms surprising. That is, agents that predict
rich stimulating environments will ﬁnd the “dark room” surpris-
ing and will leave at the earliest opportunity. The postulate of
surprise minimization therefore by no means inhibits subjects
from active, exploratory behavior and novelty-seeking, includ-
ing presumably an aesthetic experience (Friston et al., 2012b;
Schwartenbeck et al., 2013).
Third, the model is apparently compatible with some
well-established and respected art-historical theories, notably
Gombrich’s (1960) theories of the prognostic character of the
perception of pictures, the role of the beholder’s share and the
viewer’s inferences in perception, and his notion of the artist work-
ing through a cycle of scheme and correction. Indeed, Gombrich’s
(1960) famousmaxim that“[t]o read the artist’s picture is tomobi-
lize our memories and experience of the visible world and to test
his image through tentative projections” leaves the door open to
the Bayesian brain perspective; an interesting challenge would be
to recastGombrich’s account in the explanatory termsof predictive
coding, but this will not be pursued here. Furthermore, it provides
scientiﬁc footing to somephilosophical interpretations of aesthetic
experience, most notably Gadamer’s (1975/2004) hermeneutical
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scenario, which highlights the activity of the perceiving subject
vis-à-vis the aesthetic object. Gadamer describes the nature of
this exchange as ongoing and dynamic, suggesting that under-
standing is an open-ended or at least an extended process that
does not end the moment the representational content is identi-
ﬁed or the information embedded in the work of art obtained,
but also includes a more complex response and understanding:
“all encounter with the language of art is an encounter with an
unﬁnished event and is itself part of this event...There is no abso-
lute progress and no ﬁnal exhaustion of what lies in work of art”
(Gadamer, 1975/2004, p. 85).
PREDICTION ERROR OPTIMIZATION VERSUS THE RUSH TO
THE OBJECT
Any theory should be measured against empirical ﬁndings, in this
case on what we know about how people actually interact with
works of art. Seen in this light, the main objection to tenta-
tive prediction error immediately becomes apparent: the model
describes an ideal situation, which represents a distinct minor-
ity of actual encounters with art works. This does not invalidate
the theory as such, but addressing this discrepancy paves the
way to pursuing some crucial aspects of predictive mind in art
experience.
When observing people’s reactions in front of works of art in
a museum or gallery, one quickly notices that many viewers are
content with performing the simple act of recognition, displacing
the visual substance of the work as soon as possible with the kind
of understanding that evidently does not prompt or entice fur-
ther viewing. This situation is eloquently captured in an anecdote
recounted by Rudolph Arnheim:
“I remember oncewatching a teacherwith her second-graders approaching
a piece of abstract sculpture in a museum gallery. ‘What is this?’ asked
the children. The teacher, very unsure herself, went closer and looked at
the label. ‘Gift of Mr. and Mrs. Oscar Verlinski,’ she read. The children,
satisﬁed, moved to the next object.”
(Arnheim, 1992, p. 61)
Besides providing a depressively true account of the nature of
many encounters between visitors and works of art in a museum,
of the way in which people harvest meaning from works of art,
Arnheim’s (1992) observation captures some essential aspect of
the process in which viewers make sense of art images. It describes
the moment when the visual object, presented to view and solicit-
ing an understanding, gets an“answer.”As a paradigmatic example
of an act of translation, or displacement, it highlights the violent
and terminal substitution of the visual presence of an art work
with a label in the mind’s eye of the viewer. The moment the
exhibit becomes the “gift of Oscar Verlinski” in the eyes of the
inquiring children, it ceases to be a sculpture, an object endowed
with visual and aesthetic interest. In other words, the story neatly
describes the psychological reality of surprise minimization in an
encounter with an art work. By ﬁxating on identiﬁcation, the
viewer’s interrogation of an object is effectively concluded. And
as much as if in the given case the object had been answered
“correctly” (as e.g., “abstract sculpture,” or “work by Anthony
Caro”). The moment the visible content of the art object is rec-
ognized as what it depicts, the viewing is concluded, instead of
a series of exchanges between the image and the viewer open-
ing up and ushering in reciprocal play, inviting the viewer into
the rich possibilities of dialog1. Very often, moreover, the viewer
recognizes the content of the image as its subject – that is, the
culturally ingrained capacity for recognizing subjects in picto-
rial content is grafted onto the biologically ingrained propensity
for perceptual identiﬁcation – and thereby translates or displaces
the pictorial meaning2. This mode of grasping a painting or
sculpture can be seen as an extension of the evolutionary pro-
grammed operation of visual awareness, the role of which is to
produce the best current interpretation of the visual scene, in
the light of past experience, either our own or of our ances-
tors, and to make it available to the parts of the brain that plan
and execute voluntary motor outputs (Crick and Koch, 1995).
The biologically adaptive function of the human visual system,
which ontogenetically evolved in the service of assuring physical
and social survival, cannot be easily switched off when applied to
works of art.
The viewing of art images is thus frequently characterized by
a tension between unconscious reaction, a biologically ingrained
need on the part of the viewer to understand a visual scene unam-
biguously, and the fact that stopping at the moment of this initial
displacement, “answering” the image in the moment of identiﬁca-
tion, threatens to annihilate its most valuable asset – the possibility
for deeper engagement. One could say that works of art are often
victims of the biologically hard-wired operation of the human sys-
tem for recognition and identiﬁcation, victims of the “rush to the
object” (to use Michael Baxandall’s apt term; Baxandall, 2003, p.
130). Recognition and the resulting swift displacement, moreover,
need not just relate to the visible content of the image or object,
but, depending on the level of expertise and the viewer’s ability
to categorize, might rather involve the recognition of a style or an
author3.
Different works of art naturally present different types of
constraints. On the one hand, some of them are perceptually
incomplete or unstable depictions – such as many examples of
modern art, whose very identity depends on the active inferen-
tial involvement of the viewer (Gamboni, 2002). The challenge of
resolving visual ambiguity and understanding what the painting
or sculpture represents, makes the viewer aware of the interpre-
tive process. While some aspects of the labor of this ﬁlling-in
might be unconscious, it often also requires a conscious effort
from the viewer, in which the process of making sense of an
1Support for this view can be found in some psychological investigations that found
that abstract and semi-abstract paintings were rated as more meaningful when
they were accompanied by their titles as opposed to without titles. This ﬁnding is
consistent with the assumption that titles carry information and this information
aids the meaningful interpretation of the painting (Russell and Milne, 1997).
2As current experiments have demonstrated, it takes no longer to determine an
object’s category than simply to detect its presence (seeGrill-Spector andKanwisher,
2005).
3Identiﬁcation, resulting in the substitution of the artists’ name or particular style
in place of the object itself, is likely to occur in cases of non-representational art
(Hasenfus et al., 1983). Summarizing earlier ﬁndings, as well as their own empirical
studies, Leder et al. (2004) argue that experts interpret art work on the basis of
art-speciﬁc concepts, while non-experts or naïve viewers tend to use stereotypical
responses, probably drawing upon their “everyday repertoire” of concepts, such as
“personal experience, feelings and a similarity of personal surroundings” (Augustin
and Leder, 2006).
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image is brought fully into awareness. In many artistic styles,
on the other hand, the representational content is recognized
and identiﬁed swiftly (in the viewer’s phenomenology instan-
taneously), without him being aware of any effort4. In such a
case the beholder’s share consists of the unconscious deploy-
ment of perceptual-cognitive routines that render the recognition
of visual object. Perceptually unstable or otherwise challenging
images generate prediction errors related to the recognition and
identiﬁcation that the viewer (as argued by Van de Cruys and
Wagemans, 2011) may ﬁnd challenging and rewarding to resolve,
much like ambiguous perceptual occurrences in natural vision.
The problem, as just described, is that once the viewer arrives
at a certain “solution” (with or without some external source of
information, such as a label), there is often no need to go any fur-
ther beyond the recognition of content and subject and to engage
in a prolonged experience. This has been repeatedly observed in
empirical studies of museum visitors. For instance, psychologists
who were commissioned to undertake one of the most compre-
hensive empirical studies of aesthetic experience wrote in their
book: “Most people, when confronted with a work of art, sim-
ply do not know what to do. Without a goal, a problem to solve,
they remain on the outside, unable to interact with the work”
(Csikszentmihalyi and Robinson, 1990, p. 83).
In many (if not most) encounters with works of art, the
beholder’s share thus consists of sensory and conceptual predic-
tions which are generated and resolved at the level of scene/subject
recognition and identiﬁcation, without proceeding to higher levels
of cognitive and emotional predictions. Predictions, that is, expec-
tations about the immediate sensory environment are transferred
to the perception of works of art, without any adjustment being
made to expectations about the special kind of sensory environ-
ment that works of art (and museum or gallery setting) demand
and present for the beneﬁt of the viewer. This leads to two alter-
native interim conclusions. The more radical (and skeptical) one
suggests that the PEM account of real-world perception, which
involves “explaining away’ the driving (incoming) sensory signal
by matching it with a cascade of predictions pitched at a variety
of spatial and temporal scales” (Clark, 2013, p. 7), is incom-
patible with a deep experience of a work of art, as this kind
of object resists being simply ‘explained away.’ Accordingly, the
basic tenet of the Bayesian framework that the brain minimizes
unpredictability is at odds with the ontological nature of works of
art, which defy predictability. The less radical and more accom-
modating option suggests that the deeper experience of works
of art requires that viewers be able to tune or adapt their pre-
diction mechanisms to the speciﬁc visual environment of the
museum and that they have the ability to create or temporally
sustain a productive ﬂow of predictions across hierarchical lev-
els, from low-level sensory to abstract semantic and conceptual
levels. It demands that viewers consciously or implicitly come
to realize that the objects in artistic representations are not like
natural objects, that they are depictions, which means that they
4Observers can comprehend a variety of perceptual and semantic information
within the ﬁrst ﬁxation, at a mere glimpse, occurring in less than 100 ms. When
consolidated, within a few 100 ms, the conceptual gist of what is being viewed can
be represented in the form of a verbal description of the scene’s image, a description
that includes both what was perceived and what was inferred.
are mediated by the representational structure of a given artistic
medium5.
CASE STUDY
To obtain a better idea of how predictions operates in art percep-
tion, it is necessary to support a theoretical model with at least
a minimal phenomenological account of actual viewing experi-
ence of speciﬁc work of art. I shall do this with a remarkable
painting by contemporary American painter Vincent Desiderio,
which is an analytically rewarding case of an image that is not
perceptually unstable, so the viewer is able to swiftly recognize
the depicted objects; however, identiﬁcation does not yield to
understanding in the sense of a well-understood subject or an
established symbolic/iconographic theme. The viewer’s (I assume
a motivated viewer, willing and able to endure more than a ﬂeeting
encounter with the painting) initial response to the picture within
PEM is plausibly explained by the mechanisms by which sensory
predictions subserving recognition are exercised. In addition to
contextual modulation, the low spatial frequency information in
the image that encodes its gross properties triggers object and cat-
egory information, which in turn serves as a prediction template
to guide further sensory processing, i.e., the high spatial frequency
perception that conveys details (Bar, 2003, 2009; Rauss et al., 2011;
Panichello et al., 2013)6. But despite the relative ease with which
most individual objects in a pictorial space can be identiﬁed, the
beholder is left puzzled as to what is transpiring in the depicted
scene, what the meaning of the painting is. There is no help to
be obtained from applying the usual strategy of seeking external
guidance, for looking at the caption and learning that the title
of the work is Spiegel im Spiegel (Figure 1) offers no explana-
tion or deﬁnite clue. The opacity of the painting in terms of its
recognizable meaning will lead the motivated viewer to further
attempt to minimize prediction error by engaging in an active
search, and doing so by using both general strategies of PEM at
the same time: by changing sensory input through action (that is,
performing an active visual search in front of the painting) and
by alternating the predictions through perception, that is, mak-
ing the model ﬁt the sensory input (Hohwy, 2013). Without a
high-order generative model or predictive “template” (Summer-
ﬁeld et al., 2006; Summerﬁeld and Egner, 2009) against which to
match the observed sensory data, the viewer will try both to adjust
his expectations and simultaneously to explain away those visible
aspects that resist imminent understanding. While most objects in
the pictorial space can indeed be easily identiﬁed as such, there
are mismatches waiting to be resolved – most notably under-
standing the expressions and gazes of the faces of both ﬁgures,
5These alternatives could be also situated within the broader question (and ongoing
discussion) whether and to what extend human observers are Bayes optimal. Critics
point out that the basic tenet of Bayesian models that human behavior can be
explained solely in terms of optimal probabilistic inference in any given situation
is inadequate for explaining psychological phenomena (see e.g., Jones and Love,
2011; Bowers and Davis, 2012). Others, however, argue that humans are not “Bayes
optimal” in an absolute sense (Clark, 2013, p. 9), but relative to the immediate
context of the situation.
6However, Panichello et al. (2013), in their overview, add a cautionary note: “Given
that the speciﬁc neural processes that give rise to conscious perception remain
unclear, it is difﬁcult to conjecture precisely how predictive feedback inﬂuences the
contents of awareness.”
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FIGURE 1 |Vincent Desiderio, Spiegel im Spiegel (2010), oil on canvas.
©Vincent Desiderio, courtesy of Marlborough Gallery, NewYork.
or precisely deﬁning the area in which they come closest to each
other.
Prolonged engagement with the image unleashes a cycle of
PEM, which enters conscious awareness and may be verbalized
(and even socialized if the viewer interacts with a companion)
as, for example: what exactly is the bandaged man clutching
in his hand? What is the function of the white band around
the boy’s neck? In particular, what do the ﬁgures’ expressions
convey? What state is the boy in – is he sleeping, comatose,
dying? The content of the pictorial scene at the level of indi-
vidual objects will be almost completely resolved as observed
information is “iteratively reconciled across multipe levels of
visual processing hierarchy, resulting in a progressive reduction
in prediction error as the visual system settles on a single per-
ceptual interpretation of the sensory input” (Summerﬁeld and
Egner, 2009, p. 406). However, the identiﬁcation of individual
objects does not directly enable inferences about their relation-
ships and hence about the meaning of the whole scene. It
thus triggers a succession of higher-level, semantic predictions,
which unfold through an ongoing exploration of the painting
and concern above all the nature of the interaction between the
depicted ﬁgures (is their enigmatic implied relationship indeed
what the painting is “about”?). Similarly, the representational
status of the scene remains uncertain: is it to be perceived
as a real scene, or as a fantasy image (dream, vision) of the
artist, or is to be seen as the state and content of the momen-
tary state of consciousness of one of the depicted protagonists?
Moreover, for an attentive viewer, the process of prediction
error minimization does not transpire just at the level of (vir-
tual) depicted objects and their relationships. Rather, there is a
concomitant awareness of how objects arise from the painterly
medium – in this case from Desiderio’s rich and deeply textured
brushwork, with individual marks oscillating between repre-
sentational, mimetic and non-mimetic function. On that level,
one of the mismatches relates to the perception of the spatial
setting and its uncertain representational status. The ambiguous
spatial construction thwarts and frustrates attempts to recog-
nize it in terms of some kind of empirical environment; the
viewer’s perception of the virtual pictorial space as some sort
of non-descript enclosed space, delineated by the ground and
the wall, easily shifts to an awareness of the picture plane and
markings, which seem to deny any claim to mimetic optical
veracity.
AFFECTIVE PREDICTIONS
The entire process of individual meaning-making out of this
harrowing (others used even more expressive terms such as
“strikingly frightening and nightmarish”) painting, within the
predictive coding framework, is steeped in affective signiﬁcance.
While individual feelings will naturally differ, a central part of a
viewer’s encounter with the image is his or her emotional reac-
tion to it. Recent models in affective neuroscience insist that
affective meaning is not something superadded on the percep-
tual act pure and simple; rather, while the brain is engaged in
object recognition, it concurrently extracts affective value from
the observed scene, particularly its valence (Russell, 2003; Bar-
rett and Bar, 2012; see also Jaspers, 1913/1963, p. 255 for an
early formulation). Affective (and interoceptive) predictions occur
in rapid timescales and concurrently, not as a separate step,
consequently conscious percepts are intrinsically infused with
affective value7. According to Barrett and Bar’s (2012) model,
the brain’s prediction about the meaning of a visual sensa-
tion includes some representation of affective impact (or similar
sensations) from the past. Moreover, the affective state of the per-
ceiver at the moment of the initial encounter exerts top–down
effects on visual processing (Anderson et al., 2011), thereby con-
straining the formation of predictions from the sensory level
upward.
Some authors have further argued that viewers recognize the
“emotional gist”of the scene, referred to as the global emotionality,
whereby the scene can be rapidly identiﬁed as positive, nega-
tive, or neutral without having to explore the individual (local)
features of the scene. In the given case, the phenomenology of
the viewing experience does not support the notion of instan-
taneous emotional gist, but rather that of an affective reaction
that unfolds throughout the entire duration of seeing. Its initial
stages appear to be related to the perception of affective affor-
dances within the pictorial space, especially bodily postures and
facial expressions of both depicted ﬁgures8. As recent eye-tracking
studies have demonstrated, the eye initially tends to ﬁxate on
emotional objects rather than more salient, neutral ones, and
emotional saliency can override visual saliency deﬁned by features
such as intensity, color and orientation (Humphrey et al., 2012;
Niu et al., 2012). At the same time, people process the emotional
implications of biologically emotional stimuli related to survival or
7Barrett and Bar (2012) note that the affective value of the object is sometimes
represented as a property of the object, and other times it is represented as a person’s
reaction to that object.
8I use the concept of affective affordance in much the same sense as the notion
of affective salience, deﬁned as “the tendency of the item to stand out relative to
its neighbors due to an association between the semantic meaning and emotional
arousal” (Todd et al., 2012).
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reproduction automatically, but engage in more elaborative pro-
cessing when confronted with socially emotional stimuli (Sakaki
et al., 2012).
The generally weak correlation between emotions and their
predicted expressions (Fernández-Dols and Crivelli, 2013) is in
this case further augmented by the fact that neither ﬁgure’s
expression can be quickly interpreted, as they are both partly
obscured and partly indeterminate. While neither ﬁgure con-
stitutes emotional affordance of the kind usually used in neu-
roimaging experiments (that is, a stimulus with imminent threat
or fear value), both are imbued with a saliency that involves
the basic repertoire of emotional reactions. The boy’s indeter-
minate expression signals a loss of consciousness, illness, or
perhaps even death – all of them possibilities suffused with a
strong affective valence. Similarly, the man’s body, completely
wrapped in bandages, constitutes a powerful affordance whose
negative valence is linked to instinctive fears of illness, acci-
dent, or disﬁguration, that is, basic emotions related to bodily
harm and/or survival. However, it is not just such biologi-
cally determined associations that determine how the affective
response unfolds, as the process will likely also involve mem-
ories of culturally transmitted contents. Thus the eerie feeling
the bandaged human ﬁgure elicits may not derive from indi-
vidual experiences of bodily harm or medical treatment (or
fears thereof), but also from affectively inscribed memories of
experiencing and reacting to similar representations of uncanny
objects – e.g., in horror movies. One should likewise note
that while low-level visual properties generally contribute to an
object’s perceived valence (Lebrecht et al., 2012), this factor is
even more important in the case of an art work. The affec-
tive salience of the ﬁgures is thus inherently constituted by the
painterly medium, that is, by the way Desiderio’s brushwork
and handling of color depict them as objects in the pictorial
space. Furthemore, affective affordances are contextually pre-
tuned (Todd et al., 2012); in art perception such pre-tuning is
signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced by the general experiential context (e.g.,
one’s feeling about being in a museum or gallery, the pres-
ence/absence of “museum fatigue”), as well as by the affective
state engendered by cumulative past experience of viewing art
works.
To sum up so far: in the motivated viewer’s encounter with
Spiegel im Spiegel there occurs a complex interplay of predic-
tions that span every level within the hierarchical structure of
the mind/brain, from sensory/recognitional to high-level seman-
tic predictions. But whereas in a real-life situation, perception,
cognition, and action are associated with the successful suppres-
sion (“explaining away”) of prediction error or the reduction of
surprise (Clark, 2013), the viewer’s encounter with Desiderio’s
painting will almost inevitably result in a subjective awareness
of not being able to arrive at an acceptable solution as to what
the painting represents, what it “is about.” At the end, the
viewer has to settle with the best solution for the moment;
in other words, the process of optimizing relative precision of
empirical (top–down) priors and (bottom–up) sensory evidence
(Friston, 2009) temporarily subsides, only for the viewer to be
aware that the solution is precarious and provisional. Uncer-
tainty about the meaning, as a few available records suggest,
is accompanied by an unspeciﬁed, but powerful feeling, which
can be summed up in such words as uncanny, troubling,
depressing, or nightmarish9. This overall affective response is
related both to the perception of pictorial content and the
medium (as discussed above) and to the affective component
of prediction error minimization itself, as we shall presently
discuss.
THE LIMITATIONS OF THE DOPAMINERGIC REWARD
ACCOUNT
According to Van de Cruys and Wagemans (2011) tentative
prediction error hypothesis, it is the incompatibility (predic-
tion error) that causes a part of the emotionality that viewers
encounter in works of art. Their main thesis is that the reduc-
tion of unpredictability is experienced as positive and pleasurable.
Thus: “The effort of mental work one has to do to cope with
the prediction error is a condition sine qua non for receiv-
ing perceptual pleasure of a Gestalt formation (prediction error
reduction)” (TPE, 1046). The authors suggest that the degree of
mental effort viewers make to compensate for unpredictability is
related to reward. This is then further linked to dopaminergic
reward modulation, whereby unexpected reward are associated
with increased dopamine peaks. Artists are thus in the business
of postponing the ﬁnal gratiﬁcation: by using minimal predic-
tion errors painters can ensure that viewers will obtain their
reward and not give up prematurely. Similar claims have recently
been made by Kandel (2012), who argues “that the response
of dopaminergic neurons to anticipated pleasure may be the
physiological basis of the pleasure we experience when look-
ing at art. Art may give rise to feelings of well-being because it
predicts biological reward, even though further reward beyond
the pleasure of viewing and vicariously experiencing may never
materialize” (Kandel, 2012, pp. 428–429), and other recent opin-
ions concur that positive emotional valence, or pleasure, is
elicited in the transition from a state of high to low surprise
(Jofﬁly and Coricelli, 2013).
These views align with recent research on the neurobiology
of reward. It is well-established that reward has a direct, non-
volitional impact on perception, changing the salience of objects
for attention (Hickey et al., 2010). Dopamine receptors were
found to mediate prefrontal control of signals in the visual cor-
tex (Noudoost and Moore, 2011). Studies based on the monetary
reward prospect paradigm reveal that reward leads to the tun-
ing of sensory neurons and modulates the neural dynamics of
early visual category processing (Apitz and Bunzeck, 2012; for
an overview of reward-related modiﬁcation of sensory processing
in the cortex, see FitzGerald et al., 2013; Overton et al., 2014).
More speciﬁcally, Biederman and Vessel (2006) proposed that
the interpretation of a novel and richly stimulating visual pat-
tern leads to feelings of pleasure, because such patterns initially
activate an abundant set of associations in the ventral visual
pathway that manifest dense mu-opioid receptors. Such neu-
robiological accounts are supported by psychological research
9I derive this observation both from the few available comments on this painting
and from ten interpretations of it written by participants in my graduate seminar
on ekphrasis and the description of works of art.
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that suggests that ambiguity in works of art may be pleasurable
(Jakesch et al., 2013) and collectively these ﬁndings lend scientiﬁc
support to old insights that perceptual interpretation in itself is
rewarding, something that is summed up in Gombrich’s (1982)
observation on “pleasure of recognition.” However, as I shall
argue, there are grounds for a much more cautionary approach
in postulating links between reward and pleasure in visual art
perception.
First, the pleasure of recognition (or perceptual Gestalt
formation) should be considered a kind of cognitive reward,
which differs from more basic reward (Schultz, 2000); while
acknowledging the biological basis of desire for or liking of
art, it should probably be distinguished from incentive salience
(“wanting”) as a speciﬁc form of Pavlovian-related motiva-
tion for reward (for such distinctions, see Berridge, 2012). It
is as yet unclear to what extent cognitive reward share neu-
robiological mechanisms with basic forms of reward, those
which for instance activate a craving for food or a drug. Sec-
ond, conceptualizing reward in relation to art experience in
the terms of perceptual pleasure is too narrow, as it accounts
for a distinct minority of encounters with visual art. If phe-
nomenology is to be taken as a reliable guide, pleasure may
indeed characterize the nature of the viewing process in the
case of works in which perceptual recognition/identiﬁcation
is more complicated – as in the case of many modern art
styles. Upon encountering Pablo Picasso’s Guitar and Violin,
or Lyonel Feininger’s Sailboats, recognizing the objects in the
depicted scenes – that is, perceptual prediction error mini-
mization tout court – clearly is related to pleasure for many
viewers, as Van de Cruys and Wagemans (2011) propose. In
most instances, however, pleasure may have a rather limited – if
any – role in the reward that is associated with viewing art
works. A more inclusive account thus needs to reﬂect the
recent conceptualization of reward, which sees it as separated
into several components at the psychological and the neu-
rosystemic level – pleasure, incentive motivation and learning
(Dickinson and Balleine, 2010; Smith et al., 2012; Miller et al.,
2014) – or alternatively insists on dissociating motivation from
reward.
Finally, it should be brieﬂy noted that the role of dopamine
in mediating perceptual (or broadly aesthetic) pleasure is not
very clear. The authors of one recent study conﬁrmed the pres-
ence of dopaminergic activity during the anticipation and actual
experience of peak emotion in music (Salimpoor et al., 2011),
but there is little to suggest the same mechanism operates in
the perception of a visual medium as well. The authors of this
and other studies (Vuust and Frith, 2008; Schaefer et al., 2013)
point to the signiﬁcant role of temporal phenomena such as
expectation, tension, surprise prediction, and anticipation in
evoking emotion from music. In contrast, although perceiv-
ing painting or sculpture is likewise a temporal event, the role
of expectation and anticipation is of a different order. On the
other hand, cognitive wanting was found not to be directly
affected by mesolimbic dopamine ﬂuctuations (Wassum et al.,
2011) and much evidence was accumulated against the long-
standing view that dopamine mediates pleasure (Berridge, 2012,
p. 1131).
GRASPING MEANING – THE OUTCOME OF PREDICTIVE
ERROR OPTIMIZATION
As discussed above, in many (if not most) encounters with works
of art, the recognition of the subject is accomplished instanta-
neously and does not lead to extensive engagement with the work,
that is, once the minimization of prediction error at the level of
object recognition concludes the viewing, there is no expectation
of further reward and hence no motivation for a prolonged view-
ing and thinking about the work. Returning to the case study
of Vincent Desiderio’s painting, two distinct patterns of response
can be postulated. In each case, the viewer, having more or less
effortlessly accomplished the recognition of objects in the scene,
is left puzzling over the meaning of the painting – the image itself
does not provide sufﬁcient clues with which to optimize predic-
tion error. For viewer A, the semantic opacity of the painting
does not constitute a challenge to be engaged with, resulting in
a negatively valenced experience, which provides no incentive for
further viewing (or for repeating such an experience). The well-
documented aversion tomodern art can be partly explainedwithin
this framework. On the other hand, viewer B, in the course of
a much more extended, consciously reﬂected, viewing, experi-
ences a cascade of prediction errors minimizations, which entails
the simultaneous formation of new predictions, and thus again
arrives at no ﬁnal “solution” as to the meaning of the depicted
scene. At a certain point she leaves the painting with the best
interpretation available at the moment; in the terms of PEM, she
explains away the image (and her own reaction to it) given her
continuously updated generative model. The optimization of pre-
diction error concludes with the best possible outcome for the
moment, but that outcome remains tentative, as subjectively the
painting retains its enigma, lingering in memory and even gener-
ating new associations. The experience itself, although subjectively
felt as something disquieting, troubling and certainly not inher-
ently pleasurable, may ultimately be perceived as rewarding, and
as providing motivation for another encounter of this kind. This
fully accords with some recent accounts of aesthetic experience
as being disruptive and transformative at its core (Pelowski and
Akiba, 2011)10.
This is not the end of story, however, as our case study provides
an apt opportunity to observe how the response to art work within
the PEM framework is further, and perhaps decisively, affected by
the viewer’s access to external facts, some kind of extra-pictorial
information that cannot be gathered from the visible conﬁgura-
tion of the image itself. In the given case, the key information is
the knowledge that in this (and several other paintings) Deside-
rio depicted his severely physically and mentally handicapped son
Sam, who needs a tube to breathe and whom he has been con-
stantly caring for. The viewer realizes that the painting is not to
be understood entirely as a fantasy image or a dream, and that the
visible content of the scene refers to an existing aspect of reality.
Some remaining sensory mismatches are consequently minimized
(“the white tube around the boy’s neck is the breathing tube”),
while simultaneously new (semantic) ones are generated (“If the
10VandeCruys andWagemans (2011)note that peoplemay experiencepositive emo-
tions when faced with an “unsolvable painting” by reappraising negative prediction
error in a safe context, or, alternatively, by misattribution (TPEA, 1053).
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boy is the artist’s son, is it likely that the bandaged ﬁgure is the
painter himself? Is the whole painting, then about the artist’s (a
father’s) relationship/communication, or rather about the inabil-
ity to communicate with his gravely disabled child?”A brief quote
from comments made by an exceptionally perceptive art critic
captures eloquently the range of associations and feelings that
may unfold for a perceptive viewer, and the following, in fact,
is a verbal transcription of the process of PEM unfolding in the
critic’s mind: “Empathically identiﬁed with him, and bent over him
in imploring care, Desiderio is unable to establish intimacy with
his son, all the more so because he seems lost in an dream world
of his own. His son will remain a child in spirit and body all his
life. Damaged beyond repair, the boy will never become a man. I
know no greater image of human suffering in contemporary art, no
subtler image of modern alienation – the absurd nightmare that
is modern life” (Kuspit, 2011). Most viewers may not be able to
form as elaborated and sophisticated an association as an expe-
rienced art critic, but their understanding of the representational
content of the image will nevertheless alter the proﬁle of their
affective response, in which the unspeciﬁed negative feeling, as
described above, can be replaced by empathic engagement with
the ﬁgures depicted. This empathic reaction will in turn entail
both affective resonance and cognitive perspective-taking based
on generating imaginary scenarios, that is, it will involve both
cognitive and interoceptive (Seth et al., 2012; Seth, 2013) predic-
tions about what it would be like and how it would feel to be in
the same situation. Therefore, reducing the uncertainty related to
the representational content of the painting by minimizing pre-
diction error, far from “explaining the painting away,” decisively
changes the generativemodel of themotivated viewer, thus trigger-
ing a new productive cycle of perceptual, cognitive, and affective
inferences.
PREDICTIVE ERROR MINIMIZATION AND THE CULTURALITY
OF VISION
In this section I shall point to some strategic implications
of the predictive coding framework for art history and visual
studies. The observation that predictions in visual art are depen-
dent on the speciﬁc history of stimulation (Van de Cruys and
Wagemans, 2011, pp. 1044–1045, see also Clark, 2013) corre-
sponds to the long-standing and widely shared understanding
that perception depends on one’s personal and cultural back-
ground (Arnheim, 1954; Segall et al., 1966). Recent research has
extended these views by examining the qualitative difference in
the ability to predict between experts and novices, emphasiz-
ing that experts have more resources for generating predictions,
but also that they make more elaborate and accurate predic-
tions in a given context (Cheung and Bar, 2012; Panichello et al.,
2013). But importantly, the inter-individual differences in art
perception do not stem from expertise alone, but need to be
conceived more broadly. Summarizing earlier insights, Gombrich
(1960) argued that perceptual experience depends on “mental
set,” without much elaborating of this notion. More precisely,
as I shall argue, the inter-individual differences in art percep-
tion depend on three variables: (i) personality traits/affective
style – that is, how and why individuals differ in how they
respond to emotional incentives (Davidson, 2004). These have
a strong modulatory effect, especially with respect to the affec-
tive aspects of art perception, so, for example, individuals with
neurotic and anxious personality traits are more sensitive to pro-
cessing facial or bodily expressions in particular (Bishop, 2007;
Cunningham et al., 2010; Cunningham and Brosch, 2012); (ii)
culture-cognitive capital related to the experiential situation, that
is, the skills and knowledge related to visual perception and view-
ing art works; and (iii) the momentary psychosomatic state of the
observer.
Jointly, these three aspects form a mindset, which determines
the generation of top–down expectations and predictions. Alter-
natively, mindset itself can be conceived of as the sum total – or
repertoire – of predictions that pertain to the given task (Bar,
2009) and as such it is further primed by the given experi-
ential situation. In the case of a typical visual art experience,
entering the museum or art gallery (or mere prospect thereof)
serves to prime the mindset, forming a global expectation about
the experience – a potentially fascinating and enjoyable event
for person A, or the prospect of something boring and tedious
that has to be endured for person B, with many variations in
between. This general expectation conditioned by all three vari-
ables thus sets the stage for speciﬁc predictions to be generated
vis-a-vis the individual works of art encountered during the
visit.
Importantly, experience-based individual differences in view-
ing art works, which are partly dependent on culture-cognitive
capital, link the predictive coding account of art perception
to a major issue in art history and visual studies – the prob-
lem of the culturality and sociality of vision. In these and
related disciplines, the biological-social continuum of seeing is
routinely conceptualized as a distinction between vision (as a
biological act) and visuality (as culturally and socially deter-
mined; e.g., Nelson, 1996; Davis, 2011). As recently articu-
lated by Davis (2011, p. 230): “When we speak of visuality,
rather than simply vision or visual perception, we address the
difference introduced into human seeing by traditional cul-
tural meaning consolidated and reconﬁgured in images.” This
conceptual distinction, however, is problematic and calls for
alternative framework, which would have to consist of four
levels in order to capture the process of vision in its bio-
logical and social complexity with more precision (Kesner,
2009, 2014). Moving in a top–down fashion, these are the
levels of:
(1) Concepts, attitudes, values, and motives (and their discur-
sive articulation) about images, vision and representation— that
is, visuality in the strict sense of the term; these develop and persist
on a time-scale of years to centuries. (2) The level of cognitive fac-
tors, which is strongly shaped by the environment and culture and
roughly corresponds to Baxandall’s (1972) notion of the “period
eye”: semantic categories, patterns of inference experience and
training in the range of representational conventions etc., that is,
factors that operate in stretches ranging from the minutes of psy-
chological time in individual perception to the historical time of
years. (3) Perceptual strategies andprocesses – such asmechanisms
of recognition, object identiﬁcation and classiﬁcation, patterns of
saccadic eye movement, of selective visual attention, processes of
unconscious embodied emotional and emphatic response, motor
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reaction activated by perception etc. These are processes that oper-
ate on both the conscious and the unconscious level and span a
time frame of 100s of milliseconds to minutes. (4) Mechanisms
of detection of essential aspects of the scene, such as lines and
edges, movement, color, binocular disparity, and related aspects
of low-level vision – that is, biologically hard-wired unconscious
events occurring on a time scale of up to ∼250 ms. Naturally,
such a scheme implies neither a strict hierarchy nor hard bound-
aries between these stages, nor their mutual encapsulation. To the
contrary, there is an ongoing, reciprocal relationship and feed-
back, whereby biologically embedded mechanisms interact with
the higher levels of vision that can be modiﬁed by culture. Pre-
diction errors at level 4, i.e., low-level vision, concerning mainly
contrast and orientation, are sent further on in the processing
stream and integrated into more complex messages concerning
object identities, and then further on into semantic categories.
The two topmost levels – of visuality and cognitive categories –
are in a strong sense culturally relative. But importantly, there
is an increasing body of evidence suggesting that also at level
3, concerning perceptual strategies and processes, both culture
and individual perceptual history penetrate perception (for an
overview of this evidence, see Kitayama and Uskul, 2011; Rule
et al., 2013). These stages operate on different time-scales and to
an extent can be mapped as occurring in different areas of the
brain, where higher levels represent the context in which the lower
levels unfold (see also Kiebel et al., 2008; Hohwy, 2013, p. 61).
Representations thus depend on and interact with representations
at other levels both within the topography of the brain and within
the hierarchical conceptual scheme of vision outlined above.
The experience-mediated perceptual-cognitive routines and
skills that ensue from a viewer’s participation in a shared sphere
of cultural habits and protocols of seeing and a sensitivity that
is attuned to styles of representation ingrained in the viewer’s
culture are all the produce of perceptual learning and – at the
neuronal level – the mechanism of synaptic plasticity. There
is an extensive body of recent research providing evidence on
experience-dependent plasticity in adult brains and speciﬁcally
on how perceptual expertise alters visual processing, e.g., by deter-
mining nature of object representation in the visual system (Curby
and Gauthier, 2009; Spolidoro et al., 2009; May, 2011; Wong
et al., 2012; Folstein et al., 2013; Lövdén et al., 2013; Kok and de
Lange, 2014; Vetter and Newen, 2014). It has been shown that
the integration of top–down expectations and bottom–up sen-
sory input can already be observed in the early visual cortex (Kok
et al., 2013) and that past experience modulates shape assignment
and perceptual grouping (Kimchi and Hadad, 2002; Trujillo et al.,
2010). Cast in the terms of the PEM framework, previous experi-
ence and perceptual expertise generate distinct set of expectations
(or priors) which determine interpretation of the image. For-
mation of a prediction error is achieved by adjusting synaptic
efﬁcacies both between and within levels of the processing hier-
archy (Schultz, 2000; Friston, 2008). Post-synaptic effects either
may be short-lived, directly impacting perception, or may con-
trol the updating and storage of predictions by inducing changes
in synaptic growth (den Ouden et al., 2012). It is likely that it is
by this mechanism that perceptual expertise becomes stabilized in
the individual mind and by which it can even become collective
in the sense of characterizing the perceptual habits of a certain
group of people, so that commonalities can be observed in the
social world of a particular group of viewers that govern how
they form predictions in the perception of works of art (“period
eye” according to one inﬂuential art-historical paradigm – cf.
Baxandall, 1972).
This kind of expertise is both enabling and constraining, as the
following example will show. Chinese literati and literati paint-
ing form a well-deﬁned group of expert viewers of a well-deﬁned
body of art that to be understood requires a strong and spe-
ciﬁc form of visual-cognitive skills, some aspects of which can
be indirectly inferred from their extensive writings reﬂecting on
the subject. The predictions involved in their experience of paint-
ing operated at all four levels of the hierarchy: at the level of
visuality, value-based judgments and preferences suggested what
was worth looking at and was deemed to be of aesthetic value
for the given social group and this determined the most gen-
eral parameters of the perceptual encounter (e.g., by constraining
attentional allocation according to the perceived value of the
painting). At the level of cognitive factors, literati culture shaped
predictions related to the semantic categorization of paintings,
thus enabling the viewer-expert to differentiate and conceptualize
not only speciﬁc topics and subjects or various styles, but also
the variety of brushwork seen in the painting (so-called cunfa
brushstrokes). Finally, on the level of perceptual routines, dis-
tinct patterns of visual attention shaped by experience, along
with saccadic eye movements or an embodied kinesthetic pro-
prioceptive feeling of brush wielding determined the formation of
predictions related to the imminent perceptual processing of these
paintings.
This expertise, comprising a vast store of memory represen-
tations and semantic associations, but also internalized motor
representations and body schemas, provided the expert viewer
with the ability to unfold successive strings of prediction errors,
from which a rich set of expectations could be formed, entertained
and ﬁnally minimized. In contrast, the naive viewer, lacking such
cultural equipment with which to approach this particular kind
of art work has at his disposal a far more limited repertoire of
resources to respond and create meaning. Note, however, that
this type of culture-speciﬁc expertise attuned to a speciﬁc form
of representation was also constraining, as the insider-viewer was
equipped with a ﬁxed set of routine and rigid associations, gen-
erating expectations and predictions that shut out some possible
other ways in which these works could be perceived- hence the
well-documented narrow focus of literati painters on the quality
of the brushwork in a painting, while ignoring the representa-
tional quality and mimetic status of the image. The above example
would typically have involved a continuous bidirectional ﬂow of
vision across the hierarchy of levels, from high-level predictions
(visuality) down to the level of basic perceptual mechanisms and
routines, and vice versa. If culture can be seen as generator of
hyperpriors, essential to the hierarchical network of the Bayesian
brain, which is the source of a person’s perceptual fantasy of
the world (Patton et al., 2013), the crucial task for understand-
ing this is ultimately to provide a naturalistic account of how both
innate and learned priors, or contextual and structural expecta-
tions (Seriès and Seitz, 2013), or informed vs. ﬁxed priors (van
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Wassenhove, 2013) arise and are mutually co-determined and
modulated.
A likely candidate for the central, enabling hyperprior11 oper-
ating in art perception is the general pictorial competence and
the capacity of seeing in/as, that is, the ability of the human
observer to see a certain object in a depictive conﬁguration on
a pictorial surface, to see “through” the depiction to its referent
and at the same time to the nature of the relation between rep-
resentation and referent. This capacity, as psychological research
demonstrates, is acquire de novo in infants and develops onto-
genetically in humans, and it can thus be considered universal
(DeLoache et al., 2003; DeLoache, 2004; for a historical perspec-
tive on the role of seeing in/as in the origins of picture-making
see Davis, 1986, 2011). But as such, it is decisively modulated by
many culture-speciﬁc effects, which include a range of represen-
tational conventions, the nature of a particular visual medium
and many other factors spanning the hierarchy of vision from
visuality to perceptual routines. It would be enormously com-
plex to formulate a fully naturalistic account of how hyperpriors,
co-constituted at the intersection of biology and culture, enable
and constrain the formation of predictions when viewing par-
ticular art works. But importantly, some aspects of it are open
– at least in principle – to experimental study. As a brief exam-
ple, consider the case of the perception of a visual symbolic
form by the excessive action computer-game players. In this well-
deﬁned group of image users, research has provided empirically
measurable evidence of the modiﬁcation of certain perceptual
routines (e.g., Boot et al., 2008; Donohue et al., 2010; Bavelier
et al., 2011) and even of players’ affective responses to imagery
(Montag et al., 2012). One way of broadly summarizing these
ﬁndings may be that the habit of on-line acting upon, motor-
ically responding to a stream of constantly changing images
resculpts the perceptual-cognitive architecture of these players
on a synaptic level, ultimately giving rise to speciﬁc variations
in their general pictorial competence – a hyperprior expectation
that images are entities to be acted upon instantly, not some-
thing to be perused and contemplated in a prolonged fashion.
The explanation for how such individual, experience-dependent
expertise and plasticity characteristic of this kind of tempo-
rally delimited collective visual experience may become stabilized,
more permanent and transmitted to successive generations within
the same cultural milieu remains a major desideratum for fur-
ther research, but this is a topic beyond the scope of present
article.
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
I shall conclude by brieﬂy outlining several possible directions
in which the present accounts of the predictive coding frame-
work for the visual arts can be further productively elaborated.
The ﬁrst direction, mentioned above, concerns the possibility of
making some key theoretical accounts in art history and visual
studies – such as Gombrich’s (1960) classic account of the rise
of naturalistic depiction, or “a general theory of visual culture”
11Following Newsome (2013), I take hyperpriors to refer to general facts, or expec-
tations, about “embodied interaction with the physical world that structures and
constrains prior predictions and how they interact.”
(Davis, 2011) – compatible with the prediction error minimiza-
tion framework. The second direction is to elaborate the model
on the basis of further case studies of speciﬁc types of visual art
objects. The theory could likely be productively applied to many
pre-modern works of art, which in their original context of use
served as objects endowed with speciﬁc functions, and where the
“viewing” in the original setting was inextricably bound up with
(or accompanied by) some sort of embodied action. Such works
can be said to contain their own script for action; the experi-
ence of the original audience could thus be modeled through
action-oriented predictive processing (Clark, 2013), which sug-
gests that motor intentions, as they unfold into detailed motor
actions, actively elicit continuous streams of sensory results that
our brains predict. Furthermore, while Van de Cruys and Wage-
mans (2011) note that the predictive framework does not explain
the popularity of realist art, “which depicts the world as it is,
thereby conﬁrming rather than violating prediction error,” (TPEA,
1056) this genre of painting need not be discounted and the PEM
framework canbe elaborated for thenaturalistic/realistic spectrum
of artistic representations as well12.
The third challenge is even more complex, but offers the poten-
tial for truly interdisciplinary dialog between theorists of art and
neuroscientists. It has been argued that the actual virtue of pre-
dictive coding is the fact that it is typically implemented at a
level of abstraction that is intermediate between that of low-
level, biophysical, circuits and that of high-level, psychological,
behaviors (Spratling, 2013). While this indeed seems to be the
case, the greatest challenge (as noted in the opening section)
is linking the accounts of predictions at the neuronal level with
those on the cognitive-psychological and cultural levels (see also
Clark, 2013). While current research is providing an increasingly
detailed insight into neuronal mechanisms, including an account
of the interactions between prediction and error signals (Kveraga
et al., 2007; Summerﬁeld and Egner, 2009; Rauss et al., 2011; Fris-
ton et al., 2012a; Koster-Hale and Saxe, 2013; Kok et al., 2013),
the relationship between the various levels of prediction operat-
ing in visual-arts perception, between the neuronal-architecture
and cognitive-psychological levels of prediction, has hitherto been
at best tentatively and sketchily explained. In particular, future
work needs to address the nature of representational formats of
hierarchically different levels of predictions. In other words, the
notions of predictions (priors) needs to be related to range of
terms currently used bothwithin and outside the predictive coding
framework to characterize disparate contents of mental represen-
tations underlying the recognition and interpretation of sensory
content from across the hierarchy of vision, including, for exam-
ple, the “generative image model” (Yuille and Kersten, 2006), the
“pictorial schema” (Gombrich, 1960), the “image schema” (Lakoff,
2006), or “subjective internal representation” (Smith et al., 2012).
Much will also depend on whether (and how) some alignment can
be made between the predictive coding framework and other cur-
rent accounts of image perception, such as incremental grouping
theory (Roelfsema and Houtkamp, 2011).
12As one of the reviewers of this paper suggested, realistic art heightens the tension
between inferring the depicted object as a cause and painterly medium as a cause.
Either interpretation gives a predicition error, leading to alternations in perception.
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The fourth challenge relates to determining how affective
and empathic inference, as conceived in the PEM framework,
arises out of integrated interaction between large-scale brain net-
works (Bressler and Menon, 2010; Oosterwijk et al., 2012; Barrett
and Satpute, 2013). As Friston (2013, p. 1331) remarks, “the
most prescient challenge to formal description of the brain as
inference machines is how one can accommodate emotions.”
Of prime importance we need to decipher the nature of the
interaction that occurs between the affective feelings elicited by
prediction errors formed as the content and medium of an
image are processed and the affective valence elicited by the out-
come of the process of PEM (or, in conformity with a recent
conceptualization of this problem, we need to decipher the
relationship between unsigned perceptual and cognitive predic-
tion errors and signed reward prediction errors (den Ouden
et al., 2012). Finally, future experimental work, building on
the neuroimaging and eye-tracking work done with non-art
images (e.g., Itti and Baldi, 2009) and, most notably, com-
bining subjective, behavioral and neuronal data, may untangle
some aspects of prediction in art perception in different hier-
archies and their interaction. Analysis of cultural hyperpriors,
on the other hand, will likely have to be performed within
the territory of individual disciplines, rather than predictive
coding framework alone thus necessitating a multi-level, multi-
disciplinary methodology (Clark, 2013; Newsome, 2013). The
challenge for the Bayesian account of art perception (and equally
for the neuroscience of art research generally) lies in reconcil-
ing the demands of the subjective, phenomenological description
of the experience of a work of art with the rhetoric and the
argumentational style of discourse used in mind and brain sci-
ence and with a formalized account of prediction error theory.
Recognizing the inherent difﬁculty involved in meaningfully
bridging these two modes of argumentation (a problem that
undoubtedly surfaced in present article) I still wish to argue
that real progress at the intersection of art and mind/brain sci-
ence can only be achieved by attempting this kind of direct
interfacing.
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